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1 Introduction
Recent advances in behavioral economics have demonstrated that individual
decision-making su¤ers from bounded rationality and various biases.1 These
biases can be especially problematic in complex decisions that involve un-
certainty and dynamism. In these situations, the government might want
to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to
induce behavior that is closer to what individual wish they were doing. The
analysis of such corrective interventions, e.g. through taxes and subsidies,
can be called behavioral public economics. In these cases, where the gov-
ernment has an objective function that is di¤erent from that of individuals,
the government is said to be non-welfaristor paternalistic in its objectives.2
One important area where the government could improve upon individual
choice is related to goods such as education, health and insurance, which in
many countries are indeed often publicly regulated, provided or subsidised.
In a recent book, Le Grand (2003) discusses whether the clients of government
services should be treated as pawns (that is, recipients whose decisions are
mainly delegated to the provider) or queens (sovereign consumers). There are
a number of reasons why individuals are particularly prone to make mistakes
in decisions in these areas. First, the quantity of information may simply
be too great or the causal connections too di¢ cult to understand, relative
to the mental capacity of a majority of individuals. Second, mental moods
can a¤ect the decisions. Third, especially in the case of education, society
might want to make some of the education decisions on behalf of the parents
to protect the childrens rights. Finally, returns to investments and health
often accrue only in the distant future. If individuals have a tendency to
undervalue future benets (e.g. because of hyperbolic discounting, Laibson
(1997)), they might be better o¤if they delegated some of the decision making
to an outsider, e.g. the government, to protect themselves against their own
1For a survey, see for example Camerer and Loewenstein (2004).
2Recent examples of this rapidly expanding eld of research include ODonoghue and
Rabin (2003), Sheshinski (2003) and Kanbur, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004). Seade (1980)
provides a seminal analysis.
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weakness of will. Treating the customers of public services as pawns instead
of queens in certain situations can therefore be desirable.
Our aim is to take these points seriously and consider the optimal public
provision of private goods, and the optimal level of subsidies for such goods,
when individualsdemand for these goods su¤ers from the sort of mistakes
behavioral economics has highlighted. We examine what will happen to
optimal policy if the government tries to correct these mistakes by basing
its own decision on what it thinks is truly best for the individuals. In other
words, the governments objective function is paternalistic or non-welfarist.
The paper builds on what has become a now standard framework in the
literature, that is, the analysis of public provision as a part of the govern-
ments redistributive system. In the modern information-based approach to
tax analysis, initiated by Mirrlees (1971), there is, by now, a large literature
examining the role of publicly provided goods (e.g. Boadway and Keen 1993,
Edwards, Keen and Tuomala 1994, Boadway and Marchand 1995, Cremer
and Gahvari 1997, and Pirttilä and Tuomala 2002). Because of asymmetric
information between the taxpayers and the government, the government must
take individualsincentives into account in its optimal tax policy (technically
speaking, through incentive-compatibility constraints). Public provision can
then be a useful tool for redistribution if it helps to relax the harmful incen-
tive e¤ects of income taxation.
The present paper di¤ers from the existing literature by assuming that the
governments objective function is non-welfaristic. We therefore account for
two potential market mistakes: asymmetric information (as in earlier models)
and mistakes in individual decision-making. It is interesting to examine
whether these two departures from the rst best provide a rationale for public
provision in similar situations.
Instead of assuming that all individuals make similar mistakes, it is much
more realistic to allow, following ODonoghue and Rabin (2003), for di¤er-
ences in rationality.3 We therefore examine the case where individuals di¤er
3In the paper, we refer to someone as irrationalwhen his or her preferences di¤er
from what is traditionally seen as rational. Since the government is assumed to be purely
rational, an irrational person can, thus, also be described as someone whose preferences
di¤er from the governments preferences.
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in two respects, rationality and income-earning abilities (which is clearly
needed for the redistribution motive to make sense). Deriving clear-cut re-
sults in optimal tax analysis when individuals di¤er in more than one re-
spect can become notoriously complicated (see, for example the discussion
in Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau and Racionero 2002).4 We therefore follow
Blomquist and Christiansen (2003, 2004) and concentrate on a three-type
interpretation of the Mirrlees (1971) model. Building on Stern (1982) and
Stiglitz (1982), households can be divided into skilled and less-skilled groups.
In addition, one of the groups can be either fully rational or partly irrational.
Proceeding with the three-type case allows for a much easier intuitive dis-
cussion, and yet it fully captures the key mechanisms at work.
Our paper is most closely related to Kanbur, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2004),
who examine general non-welfarist optimal tax rules in a continuum case.5
We simplify the analysis by concentrating on a discrete form of the optimal
tax model, and extend the work by considering public provision and di¤er-
ences in rationality. Our study is also related to earlier work, beginning from
Musgrave (1959), on merit goods. The optimal tax treatment of merit goods,
but not their optimal public provision, is analysed by Sandmo (1983), Besley
(1988), Racionero (2001), and Schroyen (2005).6
The paper proceeds as follows. To highlight the main intuition, Section
2 presents a benchmark model where all individuals are assumed to be simi-
larly irrational. Section 3 and 4 consider the three-type version in a pooling
and separating equilibrium, respectively. Section 5 covers another policy
tool, namely using subsidies instead of public provision to a¤ect commodity
demand. Section 6 concludes.
4Tarkiainen and Tuomala (1999) present simulation solutions for the two-dimensional
case.
5After nishing the rst version of the paper, we learnt of the work by Blomquist
and Micheletto (2005) who also consider as Kanbur et al (2004) non-welfarist income
taxation and the taxation of merit goods. However, they consider neither the public
provision of private goods nor two-dimensional heterogeneity.
6From these, Racionero (2001) also examines the taxation of merit goods in a mixed tax
framework. In contrast to our paper, she considers a case where preferences are additively
separable between the merit good and other consumption and between consumption and
leisure.
4
2 The basic model: All irrational
Consider a Stiglitz (1982) -type model with public provision of private goods
along the lines of Boadway and Marchand (1995). There are two types of
households, 1 and 2. The wage rates of the households are w1 < w2. The
households supply labour l; and their gross income is y = wl. The households
skill levels are private information, and the government must design a tax
schedule based on observable income instead. The after-tax income of a
household is given by x = y   T (y), where T (y) is a non-linear tax schedule
set by the government. The household can spend its after-tax income on
two goods, a normal consumption good, c, and on another good, e, which
is also provided by the government. The extent of government provision
is denoted by g; the overall amount available to the household is e + g 
z. In other words, the households can top up the publicly provided good
through their own purchases, e. The partially indirect utility functions of
the households, for given pre and post tax income and public provision, are
denoted by v(x; y; g).
Examples of the publicly provided good can include investment in educa-
tion, old-age pension, health or insurance. The key point is that households
can rationally and without biases select the consumption of purely private
goods, x:7 However, they have di¢ culties in designing the correct level of in-
vestment on the publicly provided goods. This may be due to the complexity
of the decision. A particularly interesting case is one where the costs of pub-
licly provided goods are imminent, but the benets delayed. If households
use hyperbolic discounting, they tend to purchase too little of the publicly
provided good from the point of view of their period 0 selves and social wel-
fare. Consider, for example, the case where utility (without public provision)
is given by u(c; e; y) = u1(c; y)+u2(e; y);where  is a discount factor. With
 < 1; the households tend to undervalue the benets of e:
Instead of concentrating on a specic example, we follow Seade (1980)
and Kanbur et al. (2004) and work with a general paternalistic social wel-
7Of course, in a two good model, if e is chosen incorrectly, so is x because of the budget
constraint. We refer to the idea that if x was a vector of private goods, the household can
choose among them without mistakes.
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fare function P (x; y; g), which can, in principle, di¤er in any direction from
individual utility v(x; y; g). Let us denote the marginal rate of substitution
between g and x as MRSig;x =
vig
vix
: For ease of interpretation, we concentrate
right from the beginning on the case where
P
MRSig;x  P
i
g
P ix
>
vig
vix
= MRSig;x
for both i, so that from the social welfare point of view, individuals under-
value g: This is also the way Schroyen (2005) nds useful in thinking about
merit goods. In the example above, the social welfare function would be one
without hyperbolic discounting ( = 1); i.e. P (c; e; y) = u1(c; y) + u2(e; y):
Denote the individual marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and income by s = vy
vx
and the social marginal rate of substitution by sP = Py
Px
:
There is no need for the two to be equal. If Pg > vg; and if the labour
supply and publicly provided private good were complements, sP > s, and
the government would like the individual to supply more labour than he or
she would typically decide himself. One interpretation of this case is that
education, health and the like improve the income-earning ability and desire
of households. On the other hand, one can imagine that irrationality is
related to workaholism, i.e. to a tendency to overwork. Then sP < s.8
The social planner is assumed to have a utilitarian social welfare function
over P 1 and P 2. The constraints are a resource constraint that the tax
revenue must equal the costs of public provision for two individuals, 2rg
(where r is the marginal rate of transformation between c and g); and a
self-selection constraint that the high-ability type must not mimic the choice
of the low-ability type. Note that while the social welfare depends on P; the
self-selection constraint is similar to the standard model and depends on the
utility function generating private behaviour, v:
The lagrangean of the optimisation problem is given by
L = P 1(x1; y1; g) + P 2(x2; y2; g)
+ 

v2(x2; y2; g)  v2(x1; y1; g)+  y1 + y2   x1   x2   2rg (1)
8Hamermesh and Slemrod (2004) provide a detailed analysis of workaholism.
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and the rst-order conditions by
P 2x + v
2
x    = 0 (2)
P 2y + v
2
y +  = 0 (3)
P 1x   bv2x    = 0 (4)
P 1y   bv2y +  = 0 (5)
where bv refers to the mimicker (a type 2 representative mimicking the
choice of type 1).
2.1 Marginal tax rates
The individuals choose the labour supply by maximising v(x; y; g) subject
to the budget constraint x = y   T (y): From this, the marginal tax rate
can be expressed as MTR = T 0 = vy
vx
+ 1: The marginal tax rates for both
household types can therefore be derived by dividing (3) by (2) and (5) by
(4), respectively, and they are given by
MTR(y2) =
P 2x

 
s2   sP2

(6)
and
MTR(y1) =
P 1x

 
s1   sP1

+
bv2x

(bs  s1) ; (7)
These results give rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the publicly provided good is a complement (substitute)
to the labour supply, the marginal tax rate for the high-skilled households is
negative (positive) and the marginal tax rate for the low-skilled household has
an ambiguous (positive) sign.
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If the publicly provided good is a complement to labour supply, i.e.
sP1 > s1; the marginal tax rate for the high-skilled individual is negative,
as the government wants to boost the labour supply and indirectly induce
the individual to consume more of e: A similar e¤ect is present in the rule
for the marginal tax rate for the low-skilled (the rst term at the right of
(7)), but the rule also depends on a comparison between the marginal rate of
substitution of a mimicker and a true type 1 household. This comparison can
be signed on the basis of the single-crossing condition. Therefore, bs > s1 and
the last term in (7)) is positive. The overall sign of the marginal tax rate for
the low-skilled household remains ambiguous if the publicly provided good is
a complement to the labour supply. In the opposite case, the marginal tax
rate for type 1 household is positive.
The gist of these results is that a potential connection between the pub-
licly provided good and the labour supply a¤ects the income tax rules as
well. Unlike in a standard model (such as Boadway and Marchand 1995),
the income tax rules depend here on the decision on public provision. This
result is also derived, albeit in a di¤erent setting, by Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (2005), where public provision (daycare) is directly proportional to
labour supply.
2.2 Optimal public provision rule
Consider next the welfare impacts of public provision. The derivative of (1)
with respect to g can be written as follows:
dL
dg
= P 1g + P
2
g + v
2
g   bv2g   2r (8)
Substitution from (2) and (4), and adding and subtracting MRS1g;x and
MRS2g;x yields
8
dL
dg
=
X
MRSig;x   2r +
 
P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x
!
+
P 2x

 
P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x
!
+


bv2x
 
P
MRS1g;x   dMRSg;x
!
(9)
where the mimickers marginal rate of substitution is denoted by dMRSg;x.
When none of the true ability persons is crowded out, i.e. the publicly pro-
vided amount does not exceed the amount inviduals wish to buy themselves9,
individualsmaximisation implies that the marginal rate of substitution is
equal to the marginal rate of transformation. For two individuals, this means
that
P
MRSi = 2r: Therefore, the sign of dLdg at the second-best optimum
is determined by the rest of the terms. The terms
P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x and
P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x measure the deviations between the social planners and
the individuals marginal rate of substitution. In the case which we focus on,
Pg is larger than vg; and therefore
P
MRSig;x > MRS
i
g;x.
The sign of the last term at the right of (9) depends on the relative
valuation of g between a mimicker and social planner for type 1. In a standard
welfarist case (e.g. in Boadway and Marchand 1995), the comparison is
between MRS1g;x and dMRSg;x. There, if public provision and the labour
supply are complements, the labour supply of a mimicker is smaller than
that of true low-skilled person, and MRS1g;x > dMRSg;x: However, in our
case the sign truly depends on the comparison between
P
MRS1g;x and dMRSg;x
If public provision and the labour supply are complements, the social planner
wants the true type 1 individual to consume even more of z than he or she
otherwise would. Therefore,
P
MRS1g;x >
dMRSg;x: In the case where public
provision is a substitute for labour supply,
P
MRS1g;x can, however, be smaller
9For details see Boadway and Marchand (1995). Note, however, that Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998) show that it is optimal to have high-income households crowded out.
Since the optimal crowding out decision is not the key for our main emphasis, i.e. pater-
nalistic preferences, we abstract from that discussion in what follows.
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than dMRSg;x: The following proposition summarises:
Proposition 2 When individuals undervalue z from the viewpoint of social
welfare, public provision of z is welfare improving if the labour supply and
the publicly provided goods are complements. If the labour supply and the
publicly provided goods are substitutes, public provision may or may not be
welfare improving.
To gain intuition for the result, remember that we consider two departures
from the rst-best world: asymmetry of information and irrationality. To
correct for the latter, a paternalistic social planner imposes a positive amount
of public provision. To deal with the former distortion, earlier literature, cited
in the introduction, has shown that public provision can be used to alleviate
the harmful incentive e¤ects arising from distortionary income taxation, if
public provision and the labour supply are complements.
These two channels interact in the following way. If the labour supply and
the publicly provided good are complements, an increase in public provision
both decreases the scope of the mistake individuals make when allocating
funds between public and private consumption and also reduces the harmful
incentive e¤ects from mimicking. On the other hand, if public provision is
a substitute for labour supply, the two e¤ects contradict each other and the
net impact remains ambiguous.
In policy terms, there can exist important examples of public provision
that are useful tools to deal with both asymmetry of information and ir-
rationality. Policies that increase income-earning abilities and labour force
participation, but which individuals tend to undervalue, could include in-
vestments in education and health care.
Finally, when the labour supply and the publicly provided good are un-
related (preferences are separable between consumption and leisure), public
provision can no longer be used as a tool to reduce incentives to mimicking.
The terms related to paternalism nevertheless remain in the provision rule
even under separable preferences.10
10This can be seen more clearly when the provision rule is written as dLdg =
P
MRShg;x 
10
3 Di¤erences in rationality
There is, of course, no need to require that all individuals are equally ir-
rational. As in ODonoghue and Rabin (2003), it is more useful to assume
that irrational individuals form only a part of the population. Given that
innate rationality is something the social planner cannot directly observe,
the question is how public policy should be formulated to account for both
the perfectly and the less-than-perfectly rational households.
Combining this extension with the earlier assumption that households
di¤er in their income-earning ability leaves us with four di¤erent types of
households. Because of the complications of the problem, here we follow
Blomquist and Christiansen (2003, 2004) and concentrate on a somewhat
simpler three type model. Type 1 individuals with low wage rates are all
assumed to be irrational in their choices over publicly provided goods. Part
of the high-income earners are assumed to be irrational (type 2) and part
fully rational (type 3). For the latter class, P = v:11
The formulation of self-selection constraints becomes more complicated.
It depends, rst, on how the distributional preferences of the government
hinge on the rationality of households. Second, the ordering of the two
high-ability households now depends on how the labour supply is related to
the degree of rationality. Therefore, a large number of di¤erent cases can
emerge. In order not lose tractability, we concentrate on the case which
seems most plausible: the social planner wants to redistribute from the rich
to the poor, as in a standard income tax model, and the labour supply and
the publicly provided good, z, are complements. Then type 3 households,
while consuming more of z; supply more labour than type 2 households. Let
2r +
 dMRS  MRS1+ P 1x

 
P
MRS1   dMRS!+ P 2x

 
P
MRS2   dMRS! : If preferences
are separable between consumption and leisure, the term
 dMRS  MRS1 vanishes from
the rule.
11We could also concentrate on the case where some low-income households were rational
and others irrational in contrast to all high-income were irrational. Picking one possibility
shortens the notation and discussion, without any implication that we would in any way
propagate either option.
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us also assume that type 1 households will never want to mimic the choice
of high income earners. This means that we must consider two potential
self-selection constraints: households 3 should not be allowed to mimic type
2 households, and type 2 households should not be allowed to mimic type 1
households.12
Two possible equilibria may emerge: a separating equilbrium, where the
social planner picks a separate bundle for all households, or a pooling equil-
brium, where the planner cannot distinguish between the two lower income
types, and there is a common bundle for type 1 and type 2 households. Let
us rst concentrate on the pooling equilibrium. The separating equilibirum
is dealt with in the next section.
In a pooling equilibrium, type 1 and type 2 households receive the same
gross and net income. Thus, there is only one binding self-selection con-
straint: type 3 households should not mimic the common choice of types 1
and 2. The Lagrangean is now given by
L = P 1(x1; y1; g) + P 2(x2; y2; g) + v3(x3; y3; g)
+ 

v3(x3; y3; g)  v3(x1; y1; g)
+ 
"X
h
 
yh   xh  3rg# (10)
Remembering that x1 = x2 and y1 = y2 the rst-order conditions with
respect to xhand yh; h = 1; 3 are
(1 + ) v3x    = 0 (11)
(1 + ) v3y +  = 0 (12)
12Even if one changes the assumptions governing the ordering of the self-selection con-
straints, the nature of the solution remains similar: public provision depends on a mixture
of terms capturing irrationality and terms addressing mimicking behaviour.
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P 1x + P
2
x   bv3x   2 = 0 (13)
P 1y + P
2
y   bv3y + 2 = 0 (14)
3.1 Marginal tax rates in the pooling case
It is straightforward to see from the rst-order conditions (11) and (12) that
the marginal tax rate of type 3 is zero. Marginal tax rates for the other types
can be derived by adding and subtracting terms v1x and v
1
y into equations (13)
and (14), respectively, and dividing (14) by (13). The marginal tax rates of
types 1 and 2 can be written as
MTR1 =MTR2 =
bv3x

(bs3   s1) + P 1x

(s1   sP1 ) +
P 2x

(s2   sP2 ) (15)
There are two channels present in the income tax rate of the irrational
types: the rst term arises from the self-selection constraint and the last two
terms from irrationality. The rst term is positive, as bv3x > 0 and mimickers
marginal rate of substitution is greater than a representative of true type 1
as a result of the single-crossing property. The last two terms depend on the
di¤erence between the true types and the social planners marginal rates of
substitution. When the publicly provided good and the labour supply are
complements, sP > s. It is also natural to assume that even in a three-type
case, both P 1x and P
2
x are positive. The rule for marginal tax rates in the
pooling optimum can thus be stated in the following way
Proposition 3 The marginal tax rate of the rational high productivity type
is zero. The sign of the marginal tax rate of the other two types is ambiguous
if the publicly provided good is a complement with the labour supply(sP >
s), and positive if the publicly provided good is a substitute with the labour
supply(sP < s).
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Note nally that in a special case where P 1x = P
2
x ; i.e. the governments
valuation depends only on income level, not rationality, the rule is the same
as in the two-type case.13
3.2 Public provision in pooling equilibrium
To nd the optimal rule for public provision, we derive the derivative of
Lagrangian (10) with respect to g.
dL
dg
= P 1g + P
2
g + (1 + ) v
3
g   bv3g   3r (16)
After the same kind of manipulation as in the previous section, this can
be written as
dL
dg
=
X
i
MRSi   3r
+
 
P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x
!
+
 
P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x
!
+

P 1x

  1
 
P
MRS1g;x   dMRS2g;x
!
+

P 2x

  1
 
P
MRS2g;x   dMRS3g;x
!
(17)
The rst row again coincides with the individual optimisation when none
of the true types is crowded out. In the second row there are two terms
arising from irrationality. As the social planner values the consumption of
the publicly provided good more than types 1 and 2, these terms are positive.
The terms in the last row arise from mimicking. Consider rst the mul-
tipliers P
h
x

  1: Following Blomquist and Christiansen (2004), very useful
expressions can be obtained by di¤erentiating the Lagrange function in (10)
with respect to x1 and x2: @L
@xh
= P
h
x

 1; h = 1; 2. These expressions represent
13This can be seen by combining (13) and (15) to obtain (7).
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the welfare e¤ect of a hypothetical increase in net income xh of household
h. If the desired direction of redistribution is from an irrational high ability
type towards an irrational low ability type, it can be concluded that @L
@x1
> 0,
and @L
@x2
< 0.
To deduce the sign of the terms, we concentrate on a case where g is com-
plement to labour supply. In the rst of the terms in the last row of (17), the
comparison is between
P
MRS1g;x and dMRS3g;x: If the comparison were between
MRS1g;x and dMRS3g;x; the sign would not be clear. The true type 1 repre-
sentative works more, and, since g and the labour supply are complements,
tends to favour g more. On the other hand, the type 3 individual is rational
and therefore also favours g: Thus, MRS1g;x can be smaller or larger thandMRS3g;x: Therefore, it is not clear either whether the governments valuation
P
MRS1g;x is smaller or larger than dMRS3g;x:
The last term in (17) includes a comparison between
P
MRS2g;x and dMRS3g;x:
In general, this comparison cannot be signed. However, note that both the
mimicker and the true type 2 representative are high skilled, and therefore
they supply an equal amount of labour. If the government corrects the valua-
tion of type 2 exactly to the fully rational level,
P
MRS2g;xis as large as dMRS3g;x;
and the last term vanishes from the rule.
The following proposition summarises this discussion.
Proposition 4 Even when consumption of good g is too low from the social
welfare point of view and g is complement to the labour supply, public provi-
sion of g is not unambiguously welfare improving in a pooling equilibrium.
When the publicly provided private good and the labour supply are com-
plements, both the aim to reduce the harm from irrationality and asym-
metric information separatively would speak for a positive level of public
provision. However, when these two aims are put together, it is no longer
clear that public provision improves welfare both as a tool to correct irra-
tionality and asymmetric information. Taking into account di¤erences in
rationality, the two problems, irrationality and asymmetry of information,
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interact in a way that precludes stating simple policy rules without further
assumptions. Note that a result that has a similar character is derived by
Jordahl and Micheletto (2005). They consider a model with taste di¤erences
and di¤erences in income-earning abilities and show that, in a three-type
model, the commodity tax can have an ambiguous sign even if the sign was
unambiguous without taste di¤erences.
Finally, it can be noticed that when preferences are separable between the
labour supply and the publicly provided private good, in pooling equilibrium
we have MRS1g;x = MRS
2
g;x =
dMRS3g;x. In that case rule (17) reduces to
dL
dg
=
P
iMRS
i 3r+ P 1x


P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x

+ P
2
x


P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x

.
This implies that the social and private optima coincide only when the last
two terms are zero. These positive terms would vanish only when the agents
are rational, i.e.
P
MRS = MRS. Thus, irrationality induces a higher level
of provision than private optimum would suggest even with separable pref-
erences.
4 Three-type model and a separating equilib-
rium
The other possible case is a separating equilibrium where each household is
given a separate bundle of x and y. Now there are two binding self-selection
constraints: type 3 households should prefer his bundle to type 2 households
choice and type 2 households should not want to mimic the choice of type 1
households. The resulting Lagrange function is
L = P 1(x1; y1; g) + P 2(x2; y2; g) + v3(x3; y3; g)
+ 

v3(x3; y3; g)  v3(x2; y2; g)+  v2(x2; y2; g)  v2(x1; y1; g)
+ 
"X
h
 
yh   xh  3rg# (18)
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and the rst-order conditions are given by
v3x + v
3
x    = 0 (19)
v3y + v
3
y +  = 0 (20)
P 2x   bv3x + v2x    = 0 (21)
P 2y   bv3y + v2y +  = 0 (22)
P 1x   bv2x    = 0 (23)
P 1y   bv2y +  = 0 (24)
4.1 Marginal tax rates
By standard procedures, the following marginal tax rates can be derived from
rst-order conditions
MTR(y3) = 0 (25)
MTR(y2) =
P 2x

 
s2   sP2

+
bv3x

(bs3   s2) ; (26)
MTR(y1) =
P 1x

 
s1   sP1

+
bv2x

(bs2   s1) ; (27)
On the basis of equations (25), (26) and (27), one can write the following
proposition:
Proposition 5 If the publicly provided good is a complement to the labour
supply (i.e. s < sP ), then the marginal tax rate for the type 3 households is
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zero, and the marginal tax rates for the type 1 and type 2 households have
ambiguous signs.
Note rst that since we assume type 3 households are rational, there is
no need to distort their choice. The marginal tax rates for the type 1 and
2 households consist of two terms, a corrective term and a standard self-
selection term. As in the two type model, these have opposite signs, and the
overall signs of the marginal tax rates for 1 and 2 remain ambiguous.
4.2 Public good provision in the separating case
Consider next the welfare impacts of public provision. The derivative of (18)
with respect to g can be written as follows:
dL
dg
= P 1g + P
2
g + v
3
g + v
3
g   bv3g + v2g   bv2g   3r (28)
Following a similar procedure as in earlier sections, equation (28) can be
written as
dL
dg
=
X
MRSi   3r
+
 
P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x
!
+

1  v
2
x

 
P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x
!
+
bv2x

 
P
MRS1g;x   dMRS2g;x
!
+
bv3x

 
P
MRS2g;x   dMRS3g;x
!
(29)
The interpretation of (29) follows the ones in Sections 2 and 3. The
di¤erences
P
MRShg;x  MRShg;x , h = 1; 2, are positive.
P
MRS1g;x is likely to
be higher than dMRS2g;x: Both 1 and 2 are irrational and there are therefore
no taste di¤erences, whereas the type 1 individual works more. In general,
P
MRS2g;x can be smaller or larger than dMRS3g;x. Following the reasoning in
the previous section, they are, however, equal if the social planner corrects
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the valuation of type 2 exactly to the level chosen by the rational type 3
mimicker. In this case, the last term vanishes from the rule.
The sign of the coe¢ cient 1   v2x

is not trivial. Using the rst-order
condition (21) we nd that 1   v2x

= P
2
x

  v3x

. This is negative when
P 2x

< v
3
x

. This condition holds when the social planners valuation of the
income of type 2 is su¢ ciently small. Overall, all terms in (29) are positive or
zero, except

1  v
2
x


P
MRS2g;x   dMRS3g;x. According to this discussion,
we can formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Even when consumption of good g is too low from the social
welfare point of view and g is complement to the labour supply, public provi-
sion of g is not unambiguously welfare improving in a separating equilibrium.
The irrationality of type 1 household, implied by the term
P
MRS1g;x  
MRS1g;x leads to an unambiguously positive public provision and, thus, the
higher the distortion due to irrationality is, the higher the public provision
level should be. However, when the term referring to the irrationality of type
2 is negative, it implies that the higher the gap between the socially desirable
and the actual level of consumption of type 2 is, the lower the public provision
level should be. This can be interpreted so that if government does not value
the consumption of type 2 agents enough (i.e. if P
2
x

< v
3
x

), their irrationality
problem is worsened by public provision. As in the pooling equilibrium, there
is again a potential conict between the two policy goals of the government
(correction of asymmetric information and irrationality). Even if there is
a straightforward positive linkage between public provision and the labour
supply, the use of a single policy instrument is not unambiguously desirable.
The conditions for the optimal provision of the publicly provided good
in pooling and separating cases, Equations (17) and (29), look somewhat
di¤erent. To nd the di¤erence between the rules we determine the di¤er-
ence between dL
dg
 separating
equilibrium
and dL
dg
 pooling
equilibrium
. After some tedious manipulation
there are two terms left:
dL
dg
 separating
equilibrium
  dL
dg
 pooling
equilibrium
=
v2x

MRS2g;x  
bv2x

dMRS2g;x (30)
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This di¤erence can also be given as


 
v2g   bv2g. It is positive (negative),
if the true type 2 agent values g more (less) than the mimicker. Because the
mimicker works fewer hours than the true type agent, we can conclude that
if g and the labour supply are complements, v2g > bv2g and thus the provision
of good g tends to be greater in the separating equilirium than in the pooling
equilibrium. Given that in the pooling equilibrium, type 2 households are
problematic (as they cannot be separated from poorer type 1 households),
it is natural that the di¤erence in (30) hinges on the properties of type 2.
In a separating equilibrium, one worries less about this consideration, and
perhaps therefore the public provision can more fully account for the needs
of type 2 individuals.
Furthermore, it can also be noticed that when preferences are sepa-
rable between the publicly provided private good and leisure, v2g = bv2g ,
and the rule for the optimal provision of the publicly provided good is
dL
dg
=
P
iMRS
i 3r+ P 1x


P
MRS1g;x  MRS1g;x

+ P
2
x


P
MRS2g;x  MRS2g;x

;
both in the pooling and the separating optima. Therefore, with separable
preferences, the socially optimal rule for the publicly provided private good
in the separating equilibrium di¤ers from the privately optimal only to the
extent that individuals su¤er from irrationality.
5 Commodity taxation
Up until now we have concentrated on public provision. As earlier literature
has pointed out (starting from Edwards et al., 1994), price subsidies on sim-
ilar goods can be used as an alternative mechanism to reach the same goals.
Here we briey consider the optimal commodity tax (subsidy) rule in two
cases: the benchmark case of two types and the pooling equilibrium in the
three type case.14
14The commodity tax rule in the separating equilibrium is very similar to the simple
two type model, and it is therefore presented only in the Appendix.
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5.1 Commodity taxation in a two type model
To nd the optimal commodity tax we need to redene our model. Assume
now that there is no public provision at all and the agents use all their net
income on the consumption of two goods, c and e.15 We denote the demand
by a vector dh = [c; e], where the superscript h refers to an agent. Now there
is also a price vector q = p + t, where vector p consists of the producer
prices and t = [0; t] is tax levied on good e. Governments and agents
(partially indirect) utility functions areW (q;x; y) and v(q;x; y); respectively.
Governments budget constraint is now
P
(yi   xi) +P tdi = g, where g is
given the exogenous revenue requirement (which can also be zero). This
constraint can be rewritten on the basis of consumers budget constraint asP
yi  Ppdi = g.
Now there are two alternative ways to dene how the governments and
the individuals preferences di¤er. First, following Besley (1988), denote the
individual demand for e as eh and the value that the government would like
the individual to demand as eW;h: Then, since the good in question is a merit
good, eW;h > eh: Second, following Schroyen (2005), one can derive the merit
goods in terms of how the marginal rate of substitution between e and x,
MRShqe;x =  
V hqe
V hx
; varies with the price, qe. If the good is a merit good,
the marginal rate of substitution is higher for the government than for the
individual, i.e. MRSW;hqe;x > MRS
h
qe;x: In this case, an increase in the price
of e requires a larger compensation in terms of other consumption for the
government than for the individual.16
The Lagrangean of the optimisation problem is given by
L = W 1(q;x1; y1) +W 2(q;x2; y2)
+ 

v2(q;x2; y2)  v2(q;x1; y1)+  y1 + y2  XpTdh (31)
15The conditions for the case when public provision should be favoured over price sub-
sidies is a complex matter. This question is analysed in a welfarist case by Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998).
16The latter formulation is similar to one in Blomquist and Micheletto (2005).
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and the rst-order conditions with respect to x1, x2 and qeare now
W 1x   bv2x   pT @d1@x = 0 (32)
W 2x + v
2
x   pT
@d2
@x
= 0 (33)
W 1qe +W
2
qe + v
2
qe   bv2qe   XpT @dh@q @q@qe = 0 (34)
We derive the commodity tax rule for both the denitions of merit good,
dened above. Note that in deriving the rule in terms of eW;h; one utilises
Roys identity to obtain vhq =  vhxeh: For the governments preferences, such
a relation does not necessarily hold, as the arguments in the utility function
depend on individual choises. If, however, the government sets its preferences
to follow a "modied Roys rule", i.e. W hq =  W hx eW;h, the comparison is
possible. An alternative way is to use marginal rates of substitutionMRShq;x
for the Marshallian demands and the identity given by the Slutsky composi-
tion W hqe +W
h
x e
h = W hx
 
MRShqe;x  MRSW;hqe;x

for the social planner.
The resulting tax rule is, in its two versions 17
t =
bv2x
S
(e1   be2) +XW hx
S
(eW;h   eh) (35)
where S is the Slutsky substitution e¤ect
P
@he
@q
and
t =
bv2x
S

MRS1qe;x   dMRS2qe;x+XW hxS  MRSW;hqe;x  MRShqe;x (36)
The interpretation of this form is similar to the one in which Roys identity
is assumed to hold also for social planner; the marginal rates of substitution
is substituted for demands. Thus in the following analysis we concentrate
only on the previous form.
The rule for the optimal commodity tax rate in Eq.(35) indicates that
17For details see the Appendix.
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the sign of the optimal commodity tax depends, rst, on the di¤erences in
demands between true type 1 agents and mimickers and, second, on the dif-
ference between the socially desired and the actual demand. If mimickers
consume the good in question less than mimicked agents (e1 > be2) and con-
sumption is on too low a level from the social point of view (eW;h > eh), a
subsidy improves welfare in two ways: it both corrects the rationality problem
and makes mimicking less attractive. In the opposite case, where a mimicker
consumes more and all irrational households have too high a demand from
the social point of view, a commodity tax would improve welfare. However,
if terms have opposite signs, i.e. the mimicker is a larger consumer of the
good than a true type agent and it would socially benecial to consume more
than is actually done, then the sign of the optimal commodity tax rates re-
mains ambiguous. The rationality problem can be corrected by a negative
commodity tax, but at the same time mimicking becomes more appealing.
Thus, there is a trade-o¤ between redistribution and rationality objectives.
The optimality of commodity taxes can be summarised in the following way.
Proposition 7 The commodity tax should be negative (positive) if the true
type agent consumes more (less) than the mimicker and the desired level of
consumption is larger (smaller) than the actual level chosen. Such subsidy
(tax) would improve welfare by correcting the consumption distorted by irra-
tionality and by mitigating the self-selection constraint.
5.2 Commodity taxation in a pooling equilibrium
As in the previous section, here, too, we consider replacing public provision
of good g by commodity taxation. Using the same notation as earlier, the
Lagrangian can be given as
L = W 1(q;x1; y1) +W 2(q;x2; y2) + v3(q;x3; y3)
+ 

v3(q;x3; y3)  v3(q;x1; y1)+  "X
h
yh  
X
h
pdh
#
(37)
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The rst-order conditions with respect to xh, h = 1; 3 and qe are needed:
W 1x +W
2
x   bv3x    X
h=1;2
p
@dh
@x
= 0 (38)
(1 + )v3x   p
@d3
@x
= 0 (39)
W 1qe +W
2
qe + (1 + )v
3
qe   bv3qe   X
h
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
(40)
After some manipulations presented in the Appendix, the optimal com-
modity tax rate can be given18 as
t =
bv3x
S
 
e1   be3+X
1;2
W hx
S
 
eW;h   eh  1
S
@L
@x2
(e1   e2) (41)
Compared with the two-type economy, the two rst terms are alike. The
conclusions for the signs of these are similar to the previous section. The last
term is analogous to the "redistribution term" received in Blomquist and
Christiansen (2004). Since in a pooling equilibrium the government cannot
distinguish between type 1 and type 2 individuals, but would like to favour
type 1 individuals as they earn less, the government can use the commodity
tax as an indirect instrument to a¤ect the welfare levels between the two
agents. The derivative @L
@x2
illustrates the welfare e¤ect of an increase of type
2 agents net income and it can be assumed to be negative when redistribution
is done from high productivity types towards low ability types. With negative
S we arrive at the following conclusion.
Proposition 8 In the pooling equilibrium a subsidy is welfare-improving if
(i) the true type 1 agent consumes more than the mimicker,
(ii) consumption is at too low a level from the social point of view
and
(iii) low skilled type consumes more than high skilled type with the
same income.
18As in previous section, also here the tax rule can be presented in terms of the marginal
rates of substitution by replacing the demands eh by MRShqe;x.
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Consider the case where the labour supply and the subsidised good are
complements. Then e1 > e2; as type 1 has lower productivity. However, e1
can be smaller or larger than be3: The type 1 representative works more and his
valuation is therefore high, but the mimicker is rational, and his valuation
is also high. In sum, in contrast to the two-type case, when part of the
households are rational, it is no longer clear that a subsidy is desirable both
from irrationality and asymmetric information reasons, even if the subsidised
good is a complement to the labour supply. This result is similar to what
was derived in the case of public provision in Section 3.
6 Conclusions
Much of modern governmentsactivities are not related to night-watchman
duties or the provision of pure public goods. A major share of public ex-
penditure is directed to the funding of publicly provided private goods, such
as education, health care, care of the elderly, and pension policies. Using
a modern, information-based, optimal tax framework, this paper considered
two motives for the public provision of private goods: redistribution and
paternalism. The latter concern is warranted by recent discussion on behav-
ioural economics indicating that individuals may have a tendency towards
biased decisions related to these goods.
Informational asymmetry between the government and the taxpayers im-
plies that incentive e¤ects must be taken into account in redistributive tax
policy and the design of public services. Irrational behaviour by individuals
provides a potential scope for a paternalistic policy where the government,
through its tax and public provision policy, induces behaviour that is closer
to what it believes is truly best for the individuals. Our results show that
public provision can indeed be used as a mechanism to address these con-
cerns. This is the case, in a model where all households su¤er from similar
bounded rationality, if the social planner wants to induce individuals con-
sume more publicly provided goods than they themselves would buy and if
the publicly provided private good is a complement to the labour supply.
Then the paternalistic considerations and a desire to alleviate distortions
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from income taxation by public provision are aligned.
However, in a richer model where some of the households are fully ra-
tional, redistributive and paternalistic objectives can clash even if public
provision boosts the labour supply. This result implies that a simple policy
tool, public provision, is insu¢ cient to reach both goals in the more general
case. The intuition for this somewhat unexpected result stems from the idea
that the government may want to value the utility of irrational households
less than that of fully-rational households. On the other hand, if redistri-
bution is directed from rich to poor and the fully-rational households work
more, the government would like to favour the poorer irrational households.
In this case, the two policy objectives point to di¤erent directions.
In contrast with standard models of public provision, the decision of pub-
lic good provision also a¤ects the rules governing the marginal tax rates.
This is the case if the labour supply and the demand for publicly provided
private good are related. Then the optimal marginal tax rate rules include
novel corrective terms.
Subject to the qualications presented above, it is not entirely implausi-
ble that a case exists for public provision of certain goods for paternalistic
reasons. Needless to say, the gain from such a policy must be weighed against
the potential mistakes the social planner can make when designing paternal-
istic policies. It is also important to bear in mind the ethical dimensions
involved. A paternalistic policy that e.g. protects the individuals is wel-
comed by some, while others cannot accept such restrictions on individual
freedom.
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Appendices
Optimal commodity taxes
A two type case
Starting from the rst order condition (34) we apply Roys identity to the
parts v2qe and bv2qe. Notice that because the optimisation is done with re-
spect to individualschoices, Roys identity does not hold for the term W hqe.
Substituting for the rst-order conditions (32) and (33) yields
W 1qe +W
2
qe +

W 2x   p
@d2
@x

e2 +

W 1x   p
@d1
@x
 be2   Xp@dh
@q
@q
@qe
= 0
(42)
Add and subtract in terms W 1xe
1and p@d
1
@x
e1 to get
W 1qe +W
1
xe
1 +W 2qe +W
2
xe
2 +

W 1x   p
@d1
@x
  be2   e1
  
X
p
@dh
@x
eh   
X
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
= 0 (43)
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Using the properties p@d
@x
= 1   t@d
@x
and p@d
@q
=  d   t@d
@q
(see Edwards
et al. 1994), and dropping terms yields:
W 1qe +W
1
xe
1 +W 2qe +W
2
xe
2 + bv2x  be2   e1
  
X
1  t@d
h
@x

eh   
X
 dh   t@d
h
@q

@q
@qe
= 0 (44)
Notice that t =[0; t] and @q
@qe
= [0; 1], and thus the last row can be written
as  P1  t@eh
@x

eh P eh   t@eh
@q

= 
P
t@e
h
@x
eh+
P
t@e
h
@q
. Finally
applying the Slutsky relation @e
@q
= @he
@q
  @e
@x
e , where he is the Hicksian
demand for e; gives us
X
(W hqe +W
h
x e
h) + bv2x(be2   e1) + X t@he@q = 0 (45)
We denote
P
@he
@q
as S. In the case where only one of the goods is taxed
matrix S reduces to scalar number, and thus we can divide the equation by
it. In a more general case, where S is a larger matrix, we can multiply the
equation by the inverse of S. If one can write Wqe =  WxeP ; a sort of Roys
identity for the social planner, we can rewrite the commodity tax rule as
(35).
However, if one wants to avoid the problem with the Roys identity, de-
note Marshallian demands by marginal rates of substitution MRShq;x =  v
h
q
vhx
and rewrite the part referring to social planner with help of the Slutsky
composition as W hqe +W
h
x e
h = W hx
 
MRShqe;x  MRSW;hqe;x

to get the form in
(36).
Three types and pooling equilibrium
Manipulation is here equivalent to the one in the two type case. From (40)
we get
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W 1qe +W
2
qe   (1 + )v3xe3 + bv3xbe3   X
h
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
= 0 (46)
Substituting the rst order conditions (38) and (39) into, and adding and
subtracting in terms W 1xe
1;W 2xe
2, p@d
1
@x
e1 and p@d
2
@x
e2 gives
W 1qe +W
1
xe
1 +W 2qe +W
2
xe
2
+

W 1x   p
@d1
@x
  be3   e1+ W 2x   p@d2@x
  be3   e2
  
X
h
p
@dh
@x
eh   
X
h
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
= 0 (47)
Rearranging and adding and subtracting term
h
W 2x   p@d
2
@x
i
e1and notic-
ing that @L
@x2
= W 2x   p@d
2
@x
yields
X
1;2
 
W hqe +W
h
x e
h

+ bv3x  be3   e1+ @L@x2  e1   e2
  
X
h
p
@dh
@x
eh   
X
h
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
= 0 (48)
Next we use properties p@d
@x
= 1 t@d
@x
, p@d
@q
=  d t@d
@q
and @e
@q
= @he
@q
  @e
@x
e
to rewrite the last two terms, equivalently as in the two type case, as get

P
t@he
@q
. The condition for the optimal commodity tax is thus given by
X
1;2
 
W hqe +W
h
x e
h

+ bv3x  be3   e1  @L@x2  e2   e1+ X t@he@q = 0 (49)
Now, when one can write Wq =  WxeP and denote
P
@he
@q
as S, the
optimal commodity tax rule is given by (41). If the optimal commodity tax
rate is preferred to be given in the form of marginal rates of substitution, the
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rule is given by
t =
bv3x
S

MRS1qe;x   dMRS3qe;x
+
X
1;2
W hx
S
 
MRSW;hqe;x  MRShqe;x
  1
S
@L
@x2
 
MRS1qe;x  MRS2qe;x

(50)
Three types and separating case
To consider commodity taxation in separating case we rewrite Lagrange func-
tion, following the notation in Section 5, as
L = W 1(q; x1; y1) +W 2(q; x2; y2) + v3(q; x3; y3)
+ 

v3(q; x3; y3)  v3(q; x2; y2)+  v2(q; x2; y2)  v2(q; x1; y1)
+ 
"X
h
yh  
X
h
pdh
#
(51)
To solve the optimal commodity tax rates we need the rst-order condi-
tions with respect to xh, h = 1; 2; 3 and qe:
W 1x   bv2x   p@d1@x = 0 (52)
W 2x   bv3x + v2x   p@d2@x = 0 (53)
v3x + v
3
x   p
@d3
@x
= 0 (54)
W 1qe +W
2
qe + (1 + )v
3
qe   bv3qe + v2qe   bv2qe   X
h
p
@dh
@q
@q
@qe
(55)
After similar calculations as in the pooling case above, the optimal com-
modity tax is given by
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t =
bv2x
S
 
e1   be2+ bv3x
S
 
e2   be3+X
1;2
W hx
S
 
eP   eh (56)
or alternatively, if the form with MRShqe;x is preferred, the commodity
tax rule is
t =
X
1;2
W hx
S
 
MRSW;hqe;x  MRShqe;x

+
bv2x
S

MRS1qe;x   dMRS2qe;x+ bv3xS MRS2qe;x   dMRS3qe;x (57)
Now optimal commodity tax in (56) consists of two terms correcting mim-
icking behaviour and the last term a¤ecting irrationality of type 1 and 2
households. As S is negative, we nd that the sign of commodity tax depends
on the di¤erence in demand between mimicked and mimicker and between
socially desired and actual level of consumption. If the labour supply and
the taxed goods are complements, eP > eh and e1 > be2: However, e2 can be
smaller or larger than be3: Therefore a subsidy is not unambiguously welfare
improving even in the separating equilibrium.
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